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LEAVING THE DALE TO BE MORE FAIR: ON
CLS V. MARTINEZ AND FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
MARK STRASSER*

INTRODUCTION

In Christian Legal Society of the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez,' the Supreme Court upheld the
Hastings College of the Law's requirement that all recognized student
groups have an open membership policy. The decision has been
criticized for a variety of reasons including, for example, that the Court
conflated the First Amendment tests for speech and association.2 What
has not been adequately explored is the degree to which the Court has
modified the limited-purpose-public-forum analysis in the university
context over the past few decades, resulting in a jurisprudence that is
virtually unrecognizable in light of the more general First Amendment
doctrines. While the Court is appropriately criticized for the way that it
has sometimes interpreted First Amendment protections of speech and
association, both as a general matter and in the university context in
particular, the Martinez reasoning and result make the best of a
jurisprudence that has lost its moorings.
To make sense of what was at issue in Martinez, one must
consider two lines of First Amendment cases-those involving the
conditions under which the state is permitted to impose limitations on
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
I would like to thank Professor James Beattie for his helpful discussions of these and
related issues.
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
1. 561 U.S. _,
2. See, e.g., Natalie M. Cooley, Casenote, The Abdication ofFree AssociationElevating the Court Above the Constitution in Christian Legal Society Chapter of the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 64 SMU L. REV.
765, 769 (2011) ("The major flaw in the majority's argument is that it conflates
CLS's free speech and expressive association claims.").
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citizens' free speech rights, on the one hand, and on citizens'
associational rights, on the other. One must also consider how the Court
has applied forum jurisprudence in the university context. Once those
lines of cases are clear, especially as applied in the higher education
context, the Martinez decision will appear unsurprising. What may
appear remarkable, however, is the degree to which the Court has
mangled its own jurisprudence while allegedly attempting to apply it.
Martinez involves a measured attempt to apply First Amendment
protections and limitations within some of the confines set by the Court
in previous cases. The case is less noteworthy for its result than for its
attempt to correct and situate some of the previous cases and holdings
and, for that reason, is much more praiseworthy than is commonly
acknowledged.
Part II of this Article discusses free speech jurisprudence,
focusing on forum analysis and how it has been applied in the university
setting. Part III focuses on the right to association jurisprudence,
especially in light of how it has been analyzed with regards to
antidiscrimination protections. Part IV examines Martinez in light of
these two strands of First Amendment jurisprudence, explaining how
many of the criticisms of the opinion miss the mark. The Article
concludes that Martinez is best understood as a decision that attempts to
return free speech and association jurisprudence to a system that is both
more recognizable and more readily applied, a somewhat daunting task
in light of some of the Court's previous misapplications of existing
doctrine.
II. SPEECH LIMITATIONS

While the U.S. Constitution has long afforded special protection
to freedom of expression, there is no absolute right to say whatever one
wants whenever one wants. 3 The need for limitations on speech is clear,
the importance of free speech notwithstanding. Those limitations have
often been spelled out with reference to the distinction between
viewpoint and content discrimination, especially when the state

3. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 668 (1996) ("[T]he
First Amendment does not guarantee absolute freedom of speech . . . .").
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limitations are imposed in a forum not generally available for speech.4
Regrettably, the jurisprudence in this area has become confused,
particularly when the speech is taking place in a university setting.
A. Forum Jurisprudence
The constitutionality of state limitations on speech often depends
upon the context in which a citizen has been prevented from engaging in
free expression. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously explained
in Schenck v. United States,' "[t]he most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic." 6
Preventing a panic and the resulting loss of life and limb is a
compelling state interest.7 That said, it should not be thought that the
only time that speech is unprotected by the First Amendment is when it
would result in harm-context matters. As the Court explained in Perry
Education Association (PEA) v. Perry Local Educators' Association,8
"[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and the standard
by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ
depending on the character of the property at issue." 9
The Perry Court outlined the different kinds of fora and the
corresponding differing state burdens for justifying speech limitations"[i]n places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive
activity are sharply circumscribed.,o For example, "streets and parks . . .

4. See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007) (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-800, 806
(1985)) ("[W]hen the government permits speech on government property that is a
nonpublic forum, it can exclude speakers on the basis of their subject matter, so long
as the distinctions drawn are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum.").
5. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6. Id. at 52.
7. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1029 (5th Cir.
1987) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting) (describing the protection of "society
from loss of life and limb, [as] a legitimate, indeed compelling, state interest").
8. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
9. Id. at 44.
10. Id. at 45.
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'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."' If the
state imposes a content-based speech restriction in such a setting, the
strict-scrutiny standard requires the state to "show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end."' 2 Thus, it will be extremely difficult for the
state to justify imposing a content-based distinction in a forum that has
been traditionally reserved for the discussion of public questions.13
The test for when a limitation is permissible is less daunting,
however, when the state is not seeking to impose a content-based
regulation but, instead, is merely trying to enforce a time, place, or
manner restriction. In that event, the regulations must merely be
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication."l 4 Further, the
narrow tailoring that is required to justify a time, place, or manner
restriction is not as strict as the tailoring required for a content-based
restriction in a traditional public forum.'
Very few fora have been used for public discussion from time
immemorial-they seem limited to streets, parks, and sidewalks,16
although even this list has been qualified by the Court. For example, the
sidewalk leading from a parking lot to a post office was not classified as
a public forum,1 its similarity to a municipal sidewalk notwithstanding.
11. Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm'n for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
12. Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
13. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009)
("[G]ovemment entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech
in . . . 'traditional public fora."') (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
14. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh,

453 U.S. 114,132 (1981)).
15. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) ("[A]
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but . . . it need
not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.").
16. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citing Perry, 460
U.S. at 45).
17. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) ("The sidewalk
leading to the entry of the post office is not the traditional public forum sidewalk
referred to in Perry."); see also Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
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Merely because there are relatively few traditional fora does not
mean that strict scrutiny will rarely be invoked. The Perry Court
explained that the narrow tailoring test will be used if the speech limited
by the State would have taken place on "public property which the State
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity."' 9
Although the Constitution does not require states to set up general
purpose public fora in addition to those traditionally recognized, the
"Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the
forum in the first place." 2 0 Thus, state entities that set up a public forum
for free expression are severely limited with respect to the kinds of
21
content-based restrictions that it can impose on that forum.
A state that creates a general-purpose public forum is not thereby
required to maintain that forum indefinitely.2 2 Nonetheless, while the
forum retains that characterization, the limitations on the traditional
public forum are also applicable to the state-created, general-purpose
public forum.23
The Perry Court noted that a "public forum may be created for a
limited purpose such as use by certain groups . .. or for the discussion of
certain subjects . . . .24

As the Court in Rosenberger v. Rectors &

Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) ("But given the lateness with which the modern air
terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having
'immemorially . . . time out of mind' been held in the public trust and used for
purposes of expressive activity.") (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307

U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
18. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 ("Respondents contend that although the
sidewalk is on Postal Service property, because it is not distinguishable from the
municipal sidewalk across the parking lot from the post office's entrance, it must be
a traditional public forum and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.").
19. Perry,460 U.S. at 45.
20. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
21. See id.
22. Id. at 46 (stating that "a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open
character of the facility").
23. See id. (noting that as long as the state retains the open character of the
forum, the state "is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public
forum").
24. Id. at 46 n.7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)); see Madison
Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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Visitors of the University of Virginia2 5 later explained, where the state

has set up a limited-purpose public forum, "the State must respect the
lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech
where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by
In addition, the State is prohibited from discriminating
the forum ....
"against speech on the basis of its viewpoint." 27 Thus, speech that fits
within the limitations of the forum cannot be excluded absent a
compelling justification, although speech not falling within those
limitations can be excluded as long as the limitations are reasonable.
One final category should be mentioned. Some governmentowned fora simply are not intended for public expression. If such a
forum has been created, the government has great discretion to decide
who has access to the forum and how it will be used. The Perry Court
explained that "[i]mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the
right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and
speaker identity." 28 The standards applicable to a public forum are not
applicable in the context of a nonpublic forum in that some distinctions
that are "impermissible in a public forum . . . are inherent and

inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities
compatible with the intended purpose of the property." 29 The test for
determining whether a nonpublic forum has been limited in an
unconstitutional way is simply whether the limitations "are reasonable in
light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves. 30
The Perry distinctions are more easily understood after an
examination of the controversy at issue in that case. Two groups, the
Perry Education Association (PEA) and the Perry Local Educators'
Association (PLEA), had each sought to be the official union
representative of the district's school teachers.31 The PEA won and was
permitted to "have access to the interschool mail system and teacher

25. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
26. Id. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985)).
27. Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 392-93 (1993)).

28. Perry,460 U.S. at 49.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 40-41.
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mailboxes in the Perry Township schools',32 by virtue of being the
teachers' official representative. Arguably, being the sole official
representative in light of local law33 should entitle the representative to
easy access to the represented individuals if only to facilitate efficient
communication.
Yet, Perry was a little more complicated than the picture above
suggests for two distinct reasons. First, prior to the PEA's election as the
sole representative, both the PEA and the PLEA had represented some of
the teachers and had had access to the mail system.34 It was only after the
election that the PEA negotiated a labor agreement specifying inter alia
that it, among school employee organizations, would have sole access to
the mail system.35 To add insult to injury, some non-school-related
organizations were accorded access to the same system.36
The Perry Court held that the forum at issue was not a generalpurpose or even a limited-purpose public forum but was, instead, a
nonpublic forum.37 Because the "government property [was] not
dedicated to open communication the government [could]-without
further justification-restrict use to those who participate in the forum's

32. Id. at 39.
33. See id. at 40 (citing IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(1) (1982)) ("PEA won the
election and was certified as the exclusive representative, as provided by Indiana
law.").
34. See id. at 39 ("Prior to 1977, both the Perry Education Association (PEA)
and the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) represented teachers in the
School District and apparently had equal access to the interschool mail system.").
35. See id. at 40; see also Marie A. Failinger, New Wine, New Bottles: Private
Property Metaphors and Public Forum Speech, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 217,
303 (1997) (footnote omitted) ("PLEA, the rival union, was refused entrance to the
teachers' boxes because its message was critical of the approved union and
threatened that union's status quo and 'labor peace.' By excluding the speech of the
rival union, the teachers' union gained the power to control reception of the truth,
and the power to remind both insiders and outsiders that, as victor, it had the
privilege of the audience."); Toni M. Massaro, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez:
Six Frames, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 569, 607 n.144 (2011) (noting that the PEA
"reserved more expressive power to reach their intended audience than did a rival
union").
36. See Perry,460 U.S. at 47 (noting that "the schools do allow some outside
organizations such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and other civic and church
organizations to use the facilities").
37. Id. at 53 (stating that "the internal mail system [was] not a public forum").
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official business." 38 Ironically, the Court implied that it would have
reached the same decision even if it had found the communications
system a limited-purpose public forum; the Court noted:
[E]ven if we assume that by granting access to the
Cub Scouts, YMCA's, and parochial schools, the
School District has created a "limited" public
forum, the constitutional right of access would in
any event extend only to other entities of similar
character. While the school mail facilities thus
might be a forum generally open for use by the Girl
Scouts, the local boys' club, and other
organizations that engage in activities of interest
and educational relevance to students, they would
not as a consequence be open to an organization
such as PLEA, which is concerned with the terms
and conditions of teacher employment.39
The Court's discussion is supposed to illustrate how limited-publicforum analysis should be applied. As a preliminary matter, such a forum
may be limited by reference to the type of groups who are permitted to
use it or to the types of content that are permitted to be included within
the forum. 40 Yet, the Court's explanation was at the very least
incomplete, if only because the Court failed to note that the PEA used
this forum in addition to "the Girl Scouts, the local boys' club, and other
organizations that engage in activities of interest and educational
relevance to students." 4 1 But then the question is whether the PEA
represents one of the types of groups that is entitled to use the limited
public forum. If so, then the PLEA should also have been included,
because the PEA and the PLEA were of the same type of group and
because both groups were "concerned with the terms and conditions of
teacher employment.A 2
Suppose, instead, that the public forum was only open to groups
like the Girl Scouts. Then, the question would be how to construe the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 48.
See id at 46 n.7.
Id. at 48.
Id.
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PEA's having been granted permission to use that forum,
notwithstanding that it was not of the appropriate type. At the very least,
the Perry Court has created the potential for much constitutional
mischief. Perhaps courts should consider who uses the forum to
determine the limitations that have been placed on it. Or, perhaps courts
should use a different criterion than who in fact uses the forum. After all,
it may be that some of the organizations permitted to use the forum are of
the correct type, but that others permitted to use it (as a favor) are not of
the right type. The Perry Court's illustration of limited-public-forum
analysis heavily increases the burdens on the courts, who may have great
difficulty in determining whether an organization has been wrongly
denied access because that organization was indeed of the correct type to
use the limited forum, or whether instead an organization was
permissibly denied access because it was of the wrong type,
notwithstanding that a different organization of that same type had been
afforded access.
Perry was not the first case in which the Court seemed to use
forum doctrine in a somewhat facile manner. For example, in Widmar v.
Vincent,43 the Court examined whether the University of MissouriKansas City could exclude a religious group named Cornerstone from
using university facilities.44 The group had been permitted to use
university facilities in the past but was told that it could no longer do so
because of a regulation adopted by the Board of Curators that prohibited
"the use of University buildings or grounds 'for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching."' 4 5
When striking down the restriction, the Court explained that the
University had "created a forum generally open for use by student
groups."46 "[Because it had] done so, the University . . . assumed an

obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms."47 The Court explained that "[t]he Constitution
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open

43. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
44. Id. at 264-65.
45. Id. at 265.
46. 1d. at 267.

47. Id.
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to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first
place." 4 8 The relevant standard was a daunting one.
In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum
based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the
University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to
content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
Basically, the Court reasoned that "UMIKC [had]
that end.4 9
discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire
to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and
discussion."'o
While analyzing the case as if the forum at issue was a generalpurpose public forum, the Widmar Court itself recognized that this was
incorrect, because the forum was instead a "limited public forum." 5 1 In
what way was the forum limited? The forum was for student groups
52
rather than for the public more generally. But the question at hand was
whether individuals could be excluded because of the content of their
speech.53 While speech cannot be limited because of content in a
general-purpose public forum, there is a much different way to
characterize what happened in this case. Limited public fora can involve
content restrictions, 5 4 and one way to understand the UMKC restriction
of the limited public forum was on the basis of content. 5
48. Id. at 267-68 (citing Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Emp't Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 & n.8 (1976)).
49. Id. at 269-70 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980)).
50. Id. at 269.
51. Id. at 272.
52. Id. at 273 ("The University has opened its facilities for use by student
groups . . . .").

53. Id. ("[T]he question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the
content of their speech.").
54. See Massaro, supra note 35, at 615 ("Nor is it clear why the 'forum' in
Widmar, was a 'public' one-as the case implies-and not a 'limited public forum'.
55. See id. ("[I]t is not obvious why excluding the topic of 'religion' is
'viewpoint' versus 'subject matter' discrimination."). If the exclusion of religion
were subject matter rather than viewpoint based, then a more forgiving level of
scrutiny would be employed. That said, however, the restriction at issue might not
have passed muster even under the standard appropriate for a limited purpose public
forum. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.

2012] LEAVING THE DALE TO BE MORE FAIR

245

Why would it make a difference? Restricting a limited public
forum on the basis of content is subject to a reasonableness test rather
than to "the most exacting scrutiny,"5 6 and the former is a much more
deferential standard.
Perhaps it would be thought that once the state has created a
general purpose public forum for students, it cannot change the
characterization and limit the public forum based on content. But that is
incorrect. As the Perry Court later explained, "a State is not required to
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility . ...
A separate issue is whether the UMKC policy would have passed
muster even had the forum been viewed as a public forum limited on the
basis of content. The exclusion of Cornerstone might have been
interpreted as viewpoint rather than content based, and viewpoint-based
restrictions are prohibited even within limited-purpose fora. in his
Widmar concurrence in the judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote:
"If school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems
to me that comparable use by a group desiring to express a belief in God
must also be permitted."59 Viewpoint restrictions will not be upheld
regardless of the forum's designation,60 and thus the school's restriction
might not have passed muster even had the Court recognized the
permissibility of UMKC's imposing reasonable, content-based
56. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
57. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983).
58. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 280 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
("But the university . . . may not allow its agreement or disagreement with the
viewpoint of a particular speaker to determine whether access to a forum will be
granted.").
59. Id. at 281; see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) ("The
College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be
abhorrent.").
60. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985) ("Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he
wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, see
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 S. Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770
(1974), or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit
the forum was created, see Perry Education Ass'n., [460 U.S. 37 (1983)], the
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely
to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.").
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limitations in a limited public forum. But this means that the Widmar
Court could have reached the same result without muddying forum
jurisprudence.
B. Student Groups and Content-BasedRestrictions
The Court's apparent difficulty in differentiating between
content and viewpoint discrimination in Widmar was again evident when
the Court decided Rosenberger. At issue was a university policy
precluding the university from paying the printing costs of any student
publication that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[fj in
or about a deity or an ultimate reality." 6 1
The Rosenberger majority interpreted the policy as imposing a
62
viewpoint-based restriction. Certainly, if the policy only precluded
discussions that involved expression favoring the existence of God, then
the university's restriction was viewpoint based. However, as Justice
David Souter explained in his dissent, the regulation at issue "limit[ed]
funding to activities promoting or manifesting a particular belief not only
'in' but 'about' a deity or ultimate reality, [therefore] it applie[d] to
agnostics and atheists as well as it [did] to deists and theists."63 But this
means that the policy applied to all discussions of a particular kind of
content, regardless of viewpoint.
The Rosenberger majority's response to Justice Souter's point
was surprising. At first, the Court seemed to think that Justice Souter was
simply noting that views both supporting and undermining religion
would not receive funding. The Court then objected to the assumption
that religious views are binary in nature: "The dissent's assertion that no
viewpoint discrimination occurs because the Guidelines discriminate
against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an insupportable assumption
that all debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only response
to religious speech." 64 Then, the Court seemed to understand that Justice
Souter's point was that a multiplicity of viewpoints had been barred from
61. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823
(1995) (alteration in original).
62. Id. at 831 ("We conclude . . . that here ...

viewpoint discrimination is the

proper way to interpret the University's objections to Wide Awake.").
63. Id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 831 (majority opinion).
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the forum, although the Court was still not convinced that the ban was
therefore content rather than viewpoint based: "The dissent's declaration
that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced is
simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways."6 5
The Court's construing the silencing of multiple voices as
viewpoint discrimination would be understandable if, for example, four
views on a particular topic had been excluded while two or three other
views on that same topic had been permitted. But the University had
66
precluded providing financial support for any view on particular topics,
and thus had simply limited the forum by excluding certain contents.
The difficulty with the Rosenberger analysis was that it
suggested that removing all viewpoints on a particular topic was
nonetheless viewpoint rather than content discrimination. Such an
analysis suggests that a limitation on content will simply be interpreted
as a limitation of multiple viewpoints and will then be subject to the kind
of scrutiny reserved for viewpoint discrimination. Indeed, the Court
rather confusingly characterized viewpoint discrimination as "an
egregious form of content discrimination."67
The Court's suggestion that the difference between content and
viewpoint discrimination is a matter of degree is especially unfortunate
in a limited-public-forum analysis. As the Rosenberger Court itself
explained, the "necessities of confining a forum to the limited and
legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in
reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics."
The limitations will be upheld as long as they are reasonable, although
the "State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not 'reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum."' 69 In contrast, in a limited
public forum, the state is not permitted to "discriminate against speech
on the basis of its viewpoint."70 Characterizing the difference between

65. Id. at 831-32.
66. See id. at 896 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Guidelines "deny
funding for the entire subject matter of religious apologetics").
67. Id. at 829 (majority opinion).
68. Id. at 829 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
69. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-06).
70. Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 392-93 (1993)).
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content and viewpoint discrimination as a matter of degree in limited
forum analysis is problematic, at least in part, because the difference in
degree may well be a difference in kind---content discrimination in a
limited public forum is often permissible, whereas viewpoint
discrimination is rarely, if ever, permissible. To make matters worse, the
Court makes it difficult to know when content discrimination will instead
be treated as multiple-viewpoint discrimination.
Rosenberger is something of a conundrum for First Amendment
law. It talks about the difference between content and viewpoint
discrimination, but then seems to conflate the two.7 ' As Justice Souter
suggested in his dissent, the Rosenberger analysis "amounts to a
significant reformulation of our viewpoint discrimination precedents and
will significantly expand access to limited-access forums."72 Access will
be expanded, because the Rosenberger analysis undermines states'
ability to limit a forum on the basis of content, which means that more
contents will have to be included in limited public fora, if only for fear
that the desired content limitation would be characterized as viewpoint
discrimination and struck down.
There are different ways to understand the Rosenberger analysis,
especially because the case arose in the context of a university setting.

71. See id. at 898 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he regulation is being applied . .
. to those engaged in promoting or opposing religious conversion and religious
observances as such. If this amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the Court has all
but eviscerated the line between viewpoint and content.").
72. Id. at 899. Some commentators seem not to appreciate the degree to which
Rosenberger modifies the jurisprudence. For example, Professor Toni Massaro
writes, "[i]f, for example, a public university sets up a program for student
organizations to engage in speech, it may set the parameters of the program, define
the participants, and otherwise set the conditions for participation. If the university
satisfies the criteria above in crafting these conditions, then the program likely will
be upheld." See Massaro, supra note 35, at 609. The relevant conditions were: "basic
notions of procedural due process, a rational basis threshold of equal protection, and
a thin, rational basis threshold of substantive due process." See id. at 608. But the
University of Virginia seemed to meet these basic conditions, and its program was
nonetheless struck down. Professor Massaro suggests that "the University denied the
student staff of the publication their First Amendment rights, because it had
promoted other student publications." Id. at 611. She then explained, "To deny only
this publication University support, because of its religious perspective, was
viewpoint discrimination." Id. However, such an explication of University policy
does not give the University of Virginia sufficient credit.
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The Court might implicitly have been challenging the reasonableness of
limiting a university forum in such a way that discussions promoting or
opposing religious points of view are excluded. According to this
interpretation, which admittedly was not articulated by the Court, public
universities by their very nature are open to vigorous and wide-ranging
debate on a limitless number of subjects, so even non-viewpoint-based
exclusions of discussions of religion cannot be justified.
Consider BoardofRegents of the University of Wisconsin System
v. Southworth,73 which involved a challenge to how mandatory student
activity fees were being used.74 Some students objected to having their
student fees fund student groups "that engage[d] in political and
ideological expression offensive to [the students'] personal beliefs."
The Court accepted that "the complaining students are being
required to pay fees which are subsidies for speech they find
objectionable, even offensive."76 However, it was necessary to remember
"the important and substantial purposes of the University, which seeks to
facilitate a wide range of speech."7 7 The Court explained that the "speech
the University seeks to encourage in the program before us is
distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored
The Court rejected that it made sense to try to distinguish
bounds.
between purposes that were relevant to the forum and those that were
not: "To insist upon asking what speech is germane would be contrary to
the very goal the University seeks to pursue." 7 9
Here, the Court is suggesting that the university by its very
nature should be open to all kinds of ideas. Thus, a university could
"determine that its mission is well served if students have the means to
engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific,
social, and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside
the lecture hall." 80 A university with such a mission is not barred by the
Constitution from imposing "a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue

73. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).

74. Id. at 220-21.
75. Id. at 227.
76. Id. at 230.
77. Id. at 231.
78. Id. at 232.

79. Id.
80. Id at 233.
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to these ends."8 The Court was not thereby affording the university a
free hand with respect to how it structured its student group system.
Some protection had to be provided for students' First Amendment
82
rights. That protection would be afforded as long as the university
respected "the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of
funding support," 83 as explained in Rosenberger.84
Yet, respecting viewpoint neutrality in the way required under
Rosenberger may be more difficult than might first appear. If, indeed,
Rosenberger erases or at least blurs the line between content and
viewpoint discrimination, then it may well be that universities must steer
clear of any content-based limitations on their student groups for fear
that university limitations will be characterized as viewpoint-based and
hence prohibited. If removing all viewpoints from a particular forum can
simply be characterized as silencing a multiplicity of viewpoints and
hence viewpoint-based discrimination, then universities seeking to
remove a topic from a forum may have some difficulty in assuring that
their proposed content discrimination is evaluated in light of a
reasonableness standard rather than the much more daunting standard
reserved for viewpoint-based limitations. Further, if the University of
Wisconsin's desire to promote discussion on an almost limitless number
of issues was not something special about that university in particular
but, instead, was a purpose that almost all universities share, then
universities may have some trouble justifying content restrictions in their
limited public fora, at least insofar as they wish to impose restrictions on
student groups.
Rosenberger and Southworth together imply either that public
universities may have some difficulty in meeting the reasonableness
standard if they attempt to impose content-based restrictions on student
clubs or, instead, that content restrictions in that context may be viewed

8 1. Id.
82. Id. ("The University must provide some protection to its students' First
Amendment interests. . .
8 3. Id.
84. Id. ("Viewpoint neutrality was the obligation to which we gave substance
in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).") (parallel
citation omitted).
85. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-

32 (1995).
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as viewpoint restrictions and thus subjected to a very close scrutiny. A
different issue requiring a different analysis involves the kinds of
limitations, if any, that can be imposed on student clubs with respect to
their membership rules.
III. ASSOCIATION LIMITATIONS

The right to association jurisprudence has involved several kinds
of cases. Sometimes, the issue was relatively straightforward, e.g., when
the state attempted to deny recognition to a group because of its
viewpoint, and the Court has held that the right to association trumps the
state's ability to engage in viewpoint discrimination.86 However, other
cases were much more difficult, both because the state had important
interests at stake, including the eradication of invidiously discriminatory
policies, and because there was a marked lack of evidence that
implementing the state's nondiscrimination policy would force
organizations to change their messages. After deciding three cases
involving organizations that discriminated on the basis of sex, the Court
seemed to have settled on a relatively clear standard in light of which to
judge right of association claims.8 But then the Court implicitly rejected
the established jurisprudence while claiming to apply it, thereby
muddying the right to association jurisprudence. 90 Up until Martinez, the
right of association jurisprudence was in a state of flux.

86. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (striking down college
president's refusal to recognize a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society).
87. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding
New York antidiscrimination law that aimed to limit private club exception to the
law); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
(holding that club was not the type of intimate and private association that warranted
constitutional protection); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (declining to
extend constitutional protection to club rules barring women, in part, because the
club was large and lacked any other significant membership criteria).
88. See cases cited in supranote 87.
89. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that
Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale modified the existing jurisprudence while claiming to
apply it).
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A. Viewpoint Limitations on Association

The Court has discussed the right of association in numerous
cases. Some of those cases were brought during periods of social unrest.
For example, Healy v. James9 1 involved a decision by the President of
Central Connecticut State College to deny official recognition to a local
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society.92 The Healy Court noted
some of the costs of being denied recognition: "Its members were
deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings,
rallies, or other activities in the student newspaper; they were precluded
from using various campus bulletin boards; and-most importantlynonrecognition barred them from using campus facilities for holding
meetings."93
The Court began its analysis by noting that "[a]mong the rights
protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate
to further their personal beliefs," 94 and explained that "denial of official
recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or
abridges that associational right."95 The important question involved
determining what would count as an adequate justification. The Healy
Court said in no uncertain terms that the state's disagreement with a
group's viewpoint was an inadequate justification-the college "may not
restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed
by any group to be abhorrent."96 To justify the restriction, the President
would have to do more than merely establish that the group had offensive
views-he would have to show that the group was likely to impede the
proper functioning of the school. Thus, "[a]ssociational activities need
not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt
classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to
obtain an education." 97

91. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
issued a statement indicating that
92. Id. at 174 ("[T]he President ...
petitioners' organization was not to be accorded the benefits of official campus
recognition.").
93. Id. at 176.
94. Id. at 181.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 187-88.
97. Id at 189.
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Some of the themes discussed in Rosenberger and Southworth
were foreshadowed in Healy. If colleges and universities should be
devoted to the wide exchange of ideas and viewpoints, they certainly
should not refuse recognition to student organizations merely because of
a disagreement with the viewpoints expressed by those groups.
B. Nondiscriminationand AssociationalRights
Several of the right of association cases did not involve college
or university campuses. Instead, they involved organizations whose
membership policies violated antidiscrimination laws. The implicated
statutes were not designed to bring about a change in organizations'
messages and, further, those whose membership policies were challenged
had great difficulty in showing how their being more inclusive would
change the messages that the groups wanted to impart.
One of the most important cases" balancing rights of association
against other interests was Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,99 in which the Court
addressed whether women could be precluded from being regular
members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce.' 0 0 The Jaycees argued
that "requiring the organization to accept women as regular members ...
would violate the male members' constitutional rights of free speech and
10
association." '
The Roberts Court discussed two different kinds of "freedom of
association,,102 protected by the Constitution. "[C]hoices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme.", 0 3 The Court explained that this kind of freedom of association
98. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associations and Forums: Situating CLS v.
Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 551 (2011) (discussing "the Court's two
most important modern association cases, Roberts v. United States Jaycees and Boy
Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale").

99. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
100. Id. at 613 ("Regular membership is limited to young men between the
ages of 18 and 35, while associate membership is available to individuals or groups
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and older men.").
101. Id. at 615.
102. Id. at 617.
103. Id. at 617-18.
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Here, the
is protected "as a fundamental element of personal liberty.
Court was discussing family relationships, which "by their nature,
involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects
of one's life."',0 5 But if the protections triggered by this sort of
association are limited to family-like associations, then a variety of
relatively small groups based on identity or ideology will not be entitled
to these kinds of protections.lo0
Yet, there is another kind of association that has also received
protection, namely, "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly,
07
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."1
This kind of association is protected because it is "an indispensable
means of preserving other individual liberties.,,os By linking all of these
interests together, the Roberts Court suggests that they all should be
examined in light of the same constitutional standard-state limitations
on association affecting speech rights should be examined in light of the
same standard as state limitations on association affecting the exercise of
other First Amendment liberties. 09
In Roberts, the question at hand was whether either of these
kinds of constitutionally protected associational freedoms afforded
protection to the Jaycees. The first kind of associational freedom
104. Id. at 618.
105. Id. at 619-20.
106. See William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society, and SpeechBased Claimsfor Religious Exemptionsfrom NeutralLaws of GeneralApplicability,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1937, 1950 (2011) ("[T]he right of association to foster selfidentity has not been recognized outside the First Amendment context except in the
instance of 'intimate association,' meaning deeply personal relationships such as
family. Characterizing the religious organization's associational interest as identitybased is therefore to leave it constitutionally unprotected.").
107. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
108. Id.
109. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 98889 (2011) ("In Roberts and its progeny, however, the Court invoked the connection
with free speech to restrict the right by rejecting constitutional protection for
associations that are not predominantly expressive. With this move, the Court
abandoned its original insight that association and assembly, while linked to free
speech and press, are cognate, independent rights.").
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discussed-the family-like association-was inapposite because "the
local chapters of the Jaycees are large and basically unselective
groups."11 0 The only two disqualifying criteria were age and sex and,
apart from those qualifications, "neither the national organization nor the
local chapters employ any criteria for judging applicants for
membership."i 1
That the Jaycees were large and relatively unselective did not
mean that they should be precluded from using one of the two criteriagender-actually employed. The Court did not try to understate the
significance of what was at issue. "There can be no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire."I12
Such forced inclusion "may impair the ability of the original members to
express only those views that brought them together."m That said,
however, the Court noted that the "right to associate for expressive
purposes is not . . . absolute,"114 and explained that limitations on the
right of association "may be justified by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms."" 5
Not only was the state law prohibiting sex-based discrimination
viewpoint neutral,'' 6 but the Court was not convinced that prohibiting the
Jaycees from barring women from regular membership would change the
Jaycees' message." 7 Suppose, however, there had been evidence that
inclusive policies would have substantially changed the Jaycees'
message. The Court noted that the Minnesota law at issue "imposes no
restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with
ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
110. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 623.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. ("On its face, the Minnesota Act . . . does not distinguish between
prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint .... ).
117. Id. at 627 ("There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that
admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization's ability to
engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.").
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That said, however, the Court was not saying that a
members."
showing of any change in view at all would have constitutional import.
On the contrary, "even if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental
abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect is no greater than
is necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate purposes."' 9
The Jaycees had worried that changing the membership policy
might somehow result in a "change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting
the interests of young men." 20 However, the Court was skeptical because
the Jaycees seemed to rely "on unsupported generalizations about the
relative interests and perspectives of men and women.' 12 The Court
explained that "[i]n the absence of a showing far more substantial than
that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual
stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content
or impact of the organization's speech." 22 Basically, the Court wanted
evidence of actual change and was unwilling to defer to the Jaycees'
claim that their message would be altered were their regular membership
rules modified.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor offered
a different reason why the Court's judgment should be upheld: she did
not believe that "the Jaycees' right of association depends on the
organization's making a 'substantial' showing that the admission of
unwelcome members 'will change the message communicated by the
group's speech."'l23 She objected to the focus on the "requirement of
proof of a membership-message connection," 24 arguing instead that
whether "an association is or is not constitutionally protected in the
selection of its membership should not depend on what the association
says or why its members say it."l25 In her view, the relevant test was
whether the organization's focus was commercial,126 and she offered a
118. Id.
119. Id. at 628.
120. See id. at 627.
121. Id. at 628.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 633.
126. Id. at 634.
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standard to determine whether an organization should be so
characterized: "an association should be characterized as commercial,
and therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its
membership and other associational activities, when, and only when, the
association's activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the

First Amendment."12 7
The Court was again forced to address the degree to which a
state could interfere with membership policies in Board of Directors of
Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte.128 The Rotary's mission
was to "provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards
in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world."l 29
Women were not permitted to become Rotary members,' 30 although
women could "attend meetings, give speeches, and receive awards."' 3 '
The Rotary policy was challenged as a violation of the California's Civil
Rights Act. 132
The Court explained that "Roberts provides the framework for
analyzing appellants' constitutional claims."' 3 3 While "the Constitution
protects against unjustified government interference with an individual's
choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private
relationships"' 34 and the Constitution protects "the freedom of
individuals to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech
or religious activities," 135 additional considerations must be taken into
account when deciding whether the state is justified in forcing an
organization to modify its membership policies.136 As had been true of
127. Id at 635; see also Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the
Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105,
117 (2009-2010) ("For economic activities, the modem synthesis recognizes,
without question, the dominance of the antidiscrimination laws over any claim of
freedom of association.").
128. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
129. Id. at 539 (quoting ROTARY MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 7 (1981)).
130. Id. at 541 ("Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men.").
131. Id.

132. Id. ("The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appellants' actions violated
the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE [ § 51 (West 1982).").
133. Id. at 544.
134. Id.

135. Id.
136. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing the size of the
organization).

258

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 11I

the Jaycees organization in Roberts, "the relationship among Rotary Club
members is not the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants
constitutional protection." 37 Local Rotary Clubs might have hundreds of
members,138 and the Court expressly noted that there was "no upper limit
on the membership of any local Rotary Club" and that "[a]bout [ten]
percent of the membership of a typical club moves away or drops out
during a typical year." 39
While noting that Rotary members were "encouraged to invite
business associates and competitors to meetings," 40 the Court did not
characterize the group as engaging primarily in commercial activities.141
On the contrary, the Court described the clubs as engaging "in a variety
of commendable service activities that are protected by the First
Amendment," 4 2 and spoke approvingly of the clubs' "basic goals of
humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will,
and peace." 43 The Court suggested that permitting women to become
members would not "require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these
activities,"'44 although even if the required change "d[id] work some
slight infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association,
that infringement is justified because it serves the State's compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination against women." "41
146
mirrored
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York
47
York
Court
New
While
the
Roberts and Rotary in reasoning and result.1
recognized that the "ability and the opportunity to combine with others to
advance one's views is a powerful practical means of ensuring the
perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to
individuals as against the government,"14 8 it nonetheless denied that "in
137.
138.
more than
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Rotary Club ofDuarte, 481 U.S. at 546.
See id. ("The size of local Rotary Clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to
900.").
Id.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 549.

146. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
147. See id. at 12.
148. Id. at 13.

2012] LEA VING THE DALE TO BE MORE FAIR

259

every setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in
choosing associates, their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is
protected by the Constitution." 49 The Court noted that application of the
local nondiscrimination law did "not require the clubs 'to abandon 15or0
alter' any activities that are protected by the First Amendment,"
although it did "prevent[] an association from using race, sex, and the
other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the
city considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining
membership."'' Interestingly, in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in New York, she mentions her Roberts concurrence,152 but nowhere
suggests that the telling consideration in New York is the
commercial/expressive distinction that she had previously emphasized.
Instead, she offered a different qualification this time, noting that "there
may well be organizations whose expressive purposes would be
substantially undermined if they were unable to confine their
membership to those of the same sex, race, religion, or ethnic
background, or who share some other such common bond.,,154 If the
application of a nondiscrimination law would substantially undermine an
organization's expressive purposes, "[tihe associational rights of such
organizations must be respected.", 55
In these cases, the Court's view seemed pretty consistent.'56 An
are
subject
to
qualifications
organization's
membership
149. Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)).
150. Id. (citing Rotary Club ofDuarte,481 U.S. at 548).

151. Id
152. See id. at 18 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Court reaffirms the 'power
of States to pursue the profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory
access to commercial opportunities in our society."') (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
153. Justice O'Connor merely notes that "[p]redominately commercial
organizations are not entitled to claim a First Amendment associational or expressive
right to be free from the anti-discrimination provisions triggered by the law." See id.
at 20 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
154. N. Y State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 19 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

155. Id.
156. See generally N.Y State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. 1 (upholding New York
antidiscrimination law that aimed to limit private club exception to the law); Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (holding that club was not the type of intimate and
private association that warranted constitutional protection); Roberts, 468 U.S. 609

260

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 11I

antidiscrimination norms unless the organization's message would be
substantially modified because of the forced inclusion of undesired
members."' However, that relatively robust requirement of substantial
message modification was relaxed in a different kind of association case.
C. A Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual Exception?
Before the relaxed associational analysis is discussed, it is
helpful to consider a case that combined elements of speech and
association. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston,'58 the Court addressed whether the State of
Massachusetts could require parade organizers to permit a group of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants (GLIB) to march
in a St. Patrick's Day Parade "as a way to express pride in their Irish
heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals." 5 9 The Court
understood the parade to involve "marchers who are making some sort of
collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the
way." 60
The Court admitted that the collective point was not readily
discernible, because the parade organizers were "rather lenient in
admitting participants,"' 6' and the "multifarious voices" 62 made it
somewhat difficult "to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject
matter of the speech." 6 3 Lack of discernible message notwithstanding,
the parade organizers were quite clear in their desire to prevent GLIB
164
from marching in the parade behind a banner identifying that group.

(declining to extend constitutional protection to club rules barring women, in part,
because the club was large and lacked any other significant membership criteria).
157. See N.Y State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 19.
158. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
159. Id. at 561.
160. Id. at 568.
161. Id. at 569.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 569-70.
164. Id. at 574.
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The parade organizers explained that they were not excluding
Rather, the organizers
marchers on the basis of sexual orientation.
objected to including the gay, lesbian, and bisexual group "as its own
parade unit carrying its own banner."l 6 6 What would be communicated
by such a group carrying such a banner? The Court suggested that the
message disfavored by the organizers was "not difficult to identify,"..
because a contingent marching behind the organization's banner would
at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or
bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their
view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to
unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of
parade units organized around other identifying characteristics.
The Court then explained that "[t]he parade's organizers may not
believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to
unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other
1 69
reason for wishing to keep GLB's message out of the parade."
Regardless of which message was disfavored, it is "the choice of a
speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is
presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control.,"' The Court
explained that the government is "not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the
government."' 7 1
Hurley involved paradigmatic First Amendment expression,172
and is perhaps better read as a free speech case than an association case,

165. Id. at 572 ("Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as
such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from
parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to march.").
166. Id.
167. Id. at 574.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 574-75.
170. Id. at 575.
171. Id at 579.
172. Id. at 568 ("Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion, and
the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving
protest marches.").

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW

262

[Vol. 11I

although it might be read as both.17 3 In any event, Roberts, Rotary, New
174
York, and Hurley were all cited in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, a
case that misapplied the established right to association jurisprudence.
At issue in Dale was the Boy Scouts' decision to revoke the
adult membership of James Dale after a newspaper published a picture of
him that identified him as the co-president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance
at Rutgers University.'75 When he asked for an explanation of the
membership revocation, he was told "by letter that the Boy Scouts
'specifically forbid membership to homosexuals.' 176
The Dale Court sought to situate the issue in light of the
prevailing jurisprudence. For example, the Court recognized that it had
explained in Roberts that the right to associate "is crucial in preventing
the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express
other, perhaps unpopular, ideas," 7 7 and in New York that "forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's
freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in
a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private
178th
-Nonetheless, the Dale Court affirmed that "the freedom
viewpoints."
of expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute."'
One of the issues addressed by the Court was "whether the
forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly
affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints." 80 The Scouts had claimed that "homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law,
particularly with the values represented by the terms 'morally straight'

173. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of
,130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 n.14 (2010) (leaving
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. _,
open "[w]hether Hurley is best conceptualized as a speech or association case (or
both)").

174. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

175. Id. at 645.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 647-48 (discussing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984)).
178. Id. at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,
13 (1988)).

179. Id.
180. Id. at 650.
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and 'clean."" 8' The Court noted both that "the Scout Oath and Law do
not expressly mention sexuality or sexual orientation,"'182 and that "the
terms 'morally straight' and 'clean' are by no means self-defining." 8 3
However, the Boy Scouts asserted that they believe that "homosexual
conduct is not morally straight,"'18 4 and that they did "not want to
promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."18 5 That
was enough for the Court: "We accept the Boy Scouts' assertion. We
need not inquire further to determine the8 6nature of the Boy Scouts'
expression with respect to homosexuality."'1
Perhaps because the Court thought that others might not be
convinced that the Boy Scouts' assertions to the Court reflected their
187
public position, the Court offered more proof of the Scouts' policy.
For example, the Court cited a "1978 position statement to the Boy
Scouts' Executive Committee, signed by Downing B. Jenks, the
President of the Boy Scouts, and Harvey L. Price, the Chief Scout
That statement "expresse[d] the Boy Scouts' 'official
Executive."
position' with regard to 'homosexuality and Scouting."' 89 Yet, if this
represented the Boy Scouts' public position, one would have expected
that it would be disseminated not merely to the Executive Committee but
to the public more generally. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his
dissent, however, that policy position was not publicly disseminated.1 90
What was the official policy? Price explained that that the Boy
Scouts "do not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are
appropriate."'91 But that is not the equivalent of saying that homosexual
conduct is not morally straight. For example, one might believe that
sexual conduct is quite appropriate for certain people (e.g., members of a
church) but not for others (e.g., priests). Were that the Boy Scouts'
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 651.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. (stating "we look to the [written evidence] as instructive, if only
on the question of the sincerity of the professes beliefs").
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 652 (majority opinion).
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position, it would be false to claim that they had a general attitude about
same-sex relations. True, it would not have helped Dale insofar as the
group claimed to believe a same-sex orientation was incompatible with
having a leadership position. However, the mere assertion that
homosexuality and leadership in scouting are incompatible would
Sif 192 as the Court did not give deference to similar
presumably not suffice,
claims of association in Roberts, Rotary, and New York, all of which
asserted that being female was somehow incompatible with the demands
of general membership.
To make matters even more complicated, while the Boy Scouts'
position was that an individual with a same-sex orientation would not
"be employed by the Boy Scouts of America as a professional or nonprofessional,"l that position did have an exception, namely, if there was
"any law to the contrary."1 94 This qualification undercuts the Boy Scouts'
legal stance in two respects. First, the announced policy seems to involve
deference to local law, which suggests that internal policy permitted Dale
to have a leadership position in New Jersey, where orientation
discrimination violated the law.' 95 Second, the general refusal to employ
individuals with a same-sex orientation suggests that the Boy Scouts did
not have any reason to believe having a same-sex orientation somehow
disqualified an individual for a leadership position in particular. Rather,
the official position was that the Boy Scouts did not want someone with
a same-sex orientation to be connected to the organization in any
capacity, regardless of that person's skills and abilities.19
The Court offered additional evidence of the Boy Scouts'
disapproval of same-sex relations, noting some of the Boy Scouts'
"assertions in prior litigation."' 97 Needless to say, this is hardly the kind
of dissemination that one might expect if the Boy Scouts were trying to
impart a particular message to scouts in particular or to the public more

192. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd.
of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
193. Dale, 530 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. See id at 672.
195. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2012).
196. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the Boy Scouts'
position that "homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts").
197. See id. at 652 (majority opinion).
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generally. The arguments used in a litigation stance might not be
communicated to anyone at all not directly connected to the litigation.
The Dale Court reflected the past jurisprudence when denying
that "an expressive association can erect a shield against
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a
member from a particular group would impair its message."a
Otherwise, the Court would have decided Roberts, Rotary, and New York
differently, and would not even have attempted to evaluate whether
permitting women to be members would somehow change the message
of the respective organizations. But after denying that expressive
associations can erect a shield, the Court seemed to allow the Boy Scouts
to do exactly that.
One difficulty posed in Dale was that the articulated reason for
the firing was Dale's orientation rather than his political activities. But
this means that the Boy Scouts were claiming that an individual could be
fired even if he were not known publicly to have a same-sex
orientation-the Scouts seemed to be arguing that employing such a
person would somehow impair the Boy Scouts' ability to deliver their
desired message. But accepting that a person can be fired if he has a
same-sex orientation is in effect recognizing a particular kind of shield to
antidiscrimination laws, which is precisely what the Court had
consistently rejected in the previous case law.1 99
Rather than reconcile the previous decisions with Dale, the Court
ignored the stated reason for Dale's dismissal-his same-sex
orientation-and instead shifted the focus to some facts about Dale:
"Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group of gay Scouts who have
'become leaders in their community and are open and honest about their
sexual orientation."'2 00 The Court then claimed that "Dale's presence in
the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a
message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts
[Association] accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of

behavior." 2 0 1
198. Id. at 653.
199. See id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[U]ntil today, we have never
once found a claimed right to associate in the selection of members to prevail in the
face of a State's antidiscrimination law.").
200. Id. at 653 (majority opinion).
201. Id.
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This is surprising. One might wonder why Dale's very presence
202
rather than, for instance, activist comments that he might make, would
force the Boy Scouts to endorse same-sex conduct as legitimate. The
Dale Court cited Hurley in support, explaining that "the parade
organizers did not wish to exclude the GLIB members because of their
sexual orientations, but because they wanted to march behind a GLIB
banner."203 But the stated reason of the Boy Scouts was not that Dale was
going to be holding some sort of sign, expressing certain prohibited
204
views, or engaging in particular conduct. Rather, it was because of his
.205
orientation.
All scoutmasters were told that if they were asked about sexual
matters, the scoutmasters should refer the scouts elsewhere, 20 and there
was no reason to think that Dale was going to use his position to
promulgate a message that undermined the Boy Scouts' views.
207
Ironically, the Dale Court claimed to be following Hurley, but was in
reality turning Hurley on its head.
If, indeed, Dale was being rejected because of the particular
message he was or would be expressing, then his firing would have no
implications for someone else who, for example, was not featured in a
202. See Bhagwat, supra note 109, at 1001 ("[I]t is not at all clear why Dale's
mere presence as an assistant leader would interfere with the Scouts' ability to
communicate a message of hostility to homosexuality, unless Dale himself used his
position as a bully pulpit to defend homosexuality."). Nonetheless, Professor
Bhagwat believes that Dale was rightly decided, albeit for the wrong reasons. See
Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 554 ("[T]he Court's decision in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v.
Dale-upholding the Boys Scouts' right to discriminate in the selection of their
leadership was probably correct, no matter how lacking the Court's reasoning.").
203. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Grp. Of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1995)).
204. Id. at 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Unlike GLIB, Dale did not carry
a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any factsheet; and he expressed no intent to
send any message.").
205. Id. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen Dale was expelled from the
Boy Scouts, BSA said it did so because of his sexual orientation, not because of his
sexual conduct.").
206. See id. at 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Scouts, for example, are directed
to receive their sex education at home or in school, but not from the organization:
'Your parents or guardian or a sex education teacher should give you the facts about
sex that you must know."') (citing BOY ScouT HANDBOOK (1992)).
207. See id. at 653-61 (majority opinion) (citing Hurley for support in each
step of the legal analysis).
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local newspaper supporting gay rights. But it does not seem plausible to
believe that the Boy Scouts were really firing Dale for any message that
he had or would likely assert, because there was no evidence in the
record that Dale had ever asserted a position to the scouts that
208
undermined any position that the Boy Scouts wished to promulgate.
Further, the very position paper cited to prove the Boy Scouts' policy,
which announced that a same-sex orientation was incompatible with
leadership, made clear that orientation per se was the target rather than,
e.g., the comments that a leader might make to scouts. 20 9
A separate issue involved what Dale or anyone else might say
outside of the scouting context. But even here the Boy Scouts' claim
about message control was unpersuasive, because the Boy Scouts
admitted that someone with a different-sex orientation who supported
gay rights outside of the scouting context would not be fired for
210
expressing such opinions. Presumably, then, had Dale been President
of a Gay-Straight Alliance at Rutgers, he could have continued to be a
Scout leader as long as he self-identified as having a different-sex
orientation. But this makes even clearer that the Boy Scouts were
targeting orientation rather than trying to exert message control.2 11
The Dale Court wrote that an "association must merely engage
in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to
,,212
protection.
But such a position contradicts both the past case law and
other parts of the Dale opinion itself-the test is not whether there is a
possibility that the message could be changed at all in order for the

208. See id. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("BSA has not contended, nor does
the record support, that Dale had ever advocated a view on homosexuality to his
troop before his membership was revoked.").
209. See id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the Boy Scouts of America
position that "homosexuality and professional or non-professional employment in
Scouting are not appropriate").
210. See id. at 691 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Cf Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government
Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1938 (2006) ("[A] religious group (say, a Catholic
group) that condemns homosexuality might demand that its members share those
views. ... And if the group tolerates these dissenting heterosexual Catholics but
excludes dissenting homosexual Catholics, then it would be engaging in prohibited
sexual orientation discrimination, not permitted religious discrimination.")
(emphasis omitted).
212. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655 (majority opinion).
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organization to be protected. Rather, there has to be actual change that is

significant.2 13
Dale modifies right to association jurisprudence while claiming
to follow it. The Dale Court deferred to the organization about whether
forcing the organization to open up its membership would modify the
214
Further, the Court seemed to ignore that the
organization's message.
relevant standard was not whether the group's message might
incrementally be changed but whether, instead, application of an
antidiscrimination law would significantly affect the message.215
Ironically, in a different case concerning deference to an
organization's views about speech, the Court gave short shrift to claims
that state action would modify a message in undesired ways. At issue in
Rumsfeld v. Forumfor Academic and InstitutionalRights, Inc. (FAIR)216
was the Solomon Amendment, which provided that "if any part of an
institution of higher education denies military recruiters access equal to
that provided other recruiters, the entire institution would lose certain
federal funds." 2 17 The law was challenged by a group of law schools and
who wished to "restrict military recruiting on their
law faculties,
campuses because they object to the policy Congress has adopted with

213. See id at 648 (discussing protection that would be accorded if a person
significantly affected the group's ability to communicate). See also Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary, Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (noting that a slight
change in message would not suffice to require no change in membership); Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (noting that incidental change in message
would not trigger the associational protection).
214. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority
insists that we must 'give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression' and 'we must also give deference to an association's view
of what would impair its expression.' .. . This is an astounding view of the law. I am
unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of the scope of a
constitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her
brief and inquiring no further."); see also Bhagwat, supra note 109, at 989 (stating
that "the Court deferred to the Boy Scouts' assertions that the organization was in
fact hostile to homosexuality and that Dale's inclusion would interfere with its
ability to convey that message").
215. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
217. Id. at 51 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000 ed. & Supp. IV)).
218. Id. at 52 ("Respondent Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.
(FAIR), is an association of law schools and law faculties.").
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respect to homosexuals in the military." 2 19 Basically, the Solomon
Amendment forced universities to choose between honoring their
nondiscrimination policies (which required that employers who
discriminated on certain bases would not be afforded university access
220
for interviewing prospective employees) and receiving federal funds.
FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment "violated the law
schools' First Amendment freedoms of speech and association," 22 1
because the military would have to be afforded favored employer status
even if its employment policy was not in accord with the law school's
nondiscrimination policy.222 Thus, for example, it would not suffice for a
law school to treat the military as it treated other employers who did not
meet the relevant policy.223 Instead, the university would have to treat
this potential employer as if it followed the school's nondiscrimination
policy when it was obvious that the employer did not. But a school
selectively enforcing a nondiscrimination policy may send the undesired
message that the school is not serious about that policy.
The Court did not defer to the law schools about whether their
speech would be modified by permitting the military recruiters on
campus, noting that the "Solomon Amendment neither limits what law
schools may say nor requires them to say anything. Law schools remain
free under the statute to express whatever views they may have on the
military's congressionally mandated employment policy, all the while
retaining eligibility for federal funds."224 While the Court recognized that
many "leading First Amendment precedents have established the
principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling
people what they must say, 225 the Court reasoned that the "Solomon

219. Id.
220. See id.

221. Id. at 53.
222. See id. at 55 ("In order for a law school and its university to receive
federal funding, the law school must offer military recruiters the same access to its
campus and students that it provides to the nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most
favorable access.").
223. See id. at 56 (rejecting a reading according to which "a school excluding
military recruiters would comply with the Solomon Amendment so long as it also
excluded any other employer that violates its nondiscrimination policy").
224. Id. at 60.
225. Id. at 61.
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Amendment does not require any similar expression by law schools."226
For example, there was "nothing in this case approaching a Government,,227
mandated pledge or motto that the school must endorse.
Of course,
New Jersey was not requiring the Boy Scouts to pledge or endorse
anything, and the Court was nonetheless willing to defer to the Boy
Scouts that its message would be altered were it forced to do what it did
not want to do.
The Rumsfeld Court also addressed whether the government was
violating right-to-association guarantees through the Solomon
Amendment. The Court noted that it had recognized limitations on "the
government's ability to force one speaker to host or accommodate
another speaker's message." 2 2 8 However, the Court distinguished what
was before it from other cases by noting that the "compelled-speech
violation in each of [its] prior cases .

.

. resulted from the fact that the

complaining speaker's own message was affected by the speech it was
forced to accommodate."229 In contrast, in this case, "accommodating the
military's message does not affect the law schools' speech, because the
schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting
receptions."230
The law schools objected, because "if they treat military and
nonmilitary recruiters alike in order to comply with the Solomon
Amendment, they could be viewed as sending the message that they see
,,231I
The Court
nothing wrong with the military's policies, when they do.
disagreed on substantive grounds, explaining that "[n]othing about
recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters,
and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools
may say about the military's policies."2 32
The Court's response is interesting for two distinct reasons. First,
the Court refused to defer with respect to the content of the
communicated message. "The law schools say that allowing military

226. Id.
227. Id. at 62.
228. Id. at 63 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp.
of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 64.
231. Id. at 64-65.

232. Id. at 65.
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recruiters equal access impairs their own expression by requiring them to
associate with the recruiters, but . . . a speaker cannot 'erect a shield'

against laws requiring access 'simply by asserting' that mere association
'would impair its message."' 2 3 3 Second, not only was the Court unwilling
to defer with respect to what permitting access would mean, but the
Court went further. It announced what permitting military recruiters on
campus would not mean by denying that permitting access would send a
message of acquiescence, if not endorsement of military policy,
notwithstanding all of the difficulties associated with offering an
234
Using this
authoritative construction of a message or symbol.
reasoning, the Dale Court should simply have explained to the Boy
Scouts that New Jersey's precluding them from firing Dale did not imply
that the Boy Scouts agreed with New Jersey's policy.
There were at least two ways to view Rumsfeld. It might be
viewed as falling into the Dale line of cases where the Court interprets
the existing jurisprudence in a way that adversely impacts the LGBT
235
Or, it might be viewed as returning to the past
community.
jurisprudence where the Court will not simply defer to an organization's
claims about the message communicated by the organization doing
something that it does not want to do. Or, perhaps, the case might be
viewed as doing both. In any event, the Rumsfeld Court's unwillingness
to defer to an organization about whether the organization's doing
something would likely result in a modification of the organization's
message was repeated in Martinez.
IV. MARTINEZ

The Court's Martinez decision has been criticized for a variety of
reasons. Some have suggested that the Court turned a blind eye to efforts

233. Id. at 69 (citing Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653
(2000)).
234. Cf Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009) ("[I]t
frequently is not possible to identify a single 'message' that is conveyed by an object
or structure . . . .").
235. For example, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), might be viewed
as modifying the jurisprudence in a way that was disadvantageous to the LGBT
community. As the Court recognized in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003), "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today."
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by the Hastings College of the Law to target a particular student group.236
Others have suggested that the Court wrongly conflated different lines of
First Amendment jurisprudence and thereby arrived at an indefensible
result.237 But someone examining the facts and holding of the case in
light of the different lines of First Amendment jurisprudence should
instead see a measured response designed to bring a little order to a
jurisprudence that has been in serious disarray in a number of respects.
238
Contrary to the assertions of a variety of commentators, Martinez is a
welcome step in the direction of First Amendment coherence.
A. The Setting
At issue in Martinez was whether the Hastings College of the

Law could require all organizations receiving a special status in the
school to have an open-door policy so that any student could join any
student organization.239 The policy was challenged by a campus religious
group wishing to prevent individuals from becoming members if they did
not share the group's beliefs.240 A closely divided Court upheld the
.241
policy.
The Hastings policy implicated several constitutional issues.
First, if it could be shown that the adoption of the policy was pretextual
and that the school was adversely targeting a group because of its
viewpoint, then it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to uphold
the constitutionality of the policy. Even if the policy were not thought to

236. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. _,
_,
130 S. Ct. 2971, 3017 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) ("CLS has made a strong showing that Hastings' sudden adoption and
selective application of its accept-all-comers policy was a pretext for the law
school's unlawful denial of CLS's registration application under the
Nondiscrimination Policy.").
237. See, e.g., Cooley, supra note 2, at 769 ("The major flaw in the majority's
argument is that it conflates CLS's free speech and expressive association claims.").
238. See generally Jack Willems, Recent Development, The Loss of Freedom
of Association in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 805 (2011) (criticizing the opinion); Bhagwat, supra note
98 (same).
239. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
240. See id. at 2980.
241. See id. at 2982.
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involve viewpoint discrimination, it still would have to be examined
under the applicable association and speech jurisprudence. Further,
because this is a university setting, additional hurdles might have to be
overcome if, for example, the university had attempted to impose a
content-based restriction on a student group. Thus, Martinez had the
potential to be decided in several different ways on a number of different
bases.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination
One issue that divided members of the Court was whether CLS
had been picked out for adverse treatment or whether, instead, the school
was administering its non-exclusionary policy in an even-handed way.
CLS argued that the school's adoption of the policy was pretextual,242
, 243
and Justice Samuel Alito in dissent lent credence to that claim. Were
the Court to have accepted the accuracy of that charge, the analysis
would have been straightforward. In that event, as Justice Alito
244
suggested, Healy would control, and the Court would almost certainly
have struck down the policy. As the Healy Court explained, "[t]he
College ... may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds
the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent." 2 45
Rather than accept the accuracy of the viewpoint discrimination
claim, the Court remanded the case for consideration of the pretext
246
argument.
Remand notwithstanding, however, the Court itself
expressed a view about whether the school was in fact engaging in
viewpoint discrimination. The Martinez Court suggested that the
242. See id. at 2995.
243. Id. at 3017 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("CLS has made a strong showing that
Hastings' sudden adoption and selective application of its accept-all-comers policy
was a pretext for the law school's unlawful denial of CLS's registration application
under the Nondiscrimination Policy.").
244. Id. at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("I think that Healy is largely
controlling.").
245. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972).
246. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 ("On remand, the Ninth Circuit may consider
CLS's pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is preserved."). See also Epstein,
supra note 127, at 106 (noting that there was a remand "to see if CLS could still
pursue its claim that Hastings had used its all-comers policy as a pretext for
impermissible viewpoint discrimination").
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religious group was not being discriminated against but, instead, was
247
seeking special treatment. The majority rejected that Healy controlled
precisely because the majority did not believe that Hastings was guilty of
248
viewpoint discrimination.
C. Hastingsand the Right to Association
The Martinez Court framed the issue before it as whether the
Constitution permits "a public law school [to] condition its official
recognition of a student group-and the attendant use of school funds
and facilities-on the organization's agreement to open eligibility for
membership and leadership to all students." 2 49 The student group had
particular views about the conditions under which sexual relations should
take place ("sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between
a man and a woman" 25 0 ) and excluded anyone who engaged in
"unrepentant homosexual conduct. 251 The group also barred anyone
from being a member who did not share the group's religious
convictions.25 2
CLS suggested that the school's policy impaired the group's
expression and association rights "by prompting it, on pain of
relinquishing the advantages of recognition, to accept members who do
247. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978 ("CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not
parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings'
policy."). Here, the Court employs an approach against a religious group that
religious groups have sometimes used when seeking to justify the denial of rights to
members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) community. Cf Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (discussing the claim that Amendment 2 "does
no more than deny homosexuals special rights").
248. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2987 n.15 ("Hastings' all-comers policy is
paradigmatically viewpoint neutral. The dissent's contention that 'the identity of the
student group' is the only 'way of distinguishing Healy,' is thus untenable.") (citing
id. at 3008 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
249. Id. at 2978 (majority opinion).
250. Id. at 2980.
251. Id. at 2980. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that CLS
also bars anyone who engages in unrepentant, nonmarital, heterosexual conduct. See
Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Those who
engage in sexual conduct outside of a traditional marriage are not invited to become
CLS members unless they repent the conduct and affirm the statement of faith.").
252. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980.
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not share the organization's core beliefs about religion and sexual
orientation."253 Thus, the group feared that its core message might be
changed if it were prevented from limiting membership to those with the
"correct" views. 2 54 But whether the group's message would in fact be
changed by relaxing its membership rules is an empirical matter255 that
would presumably depend upon whether students who did not share the
organization's views would in fact become members and, if so, how
256
many. As the Court made clear in most of the association cases, the
inability to exclude might not affect the message at all, much less
257
significantly.
Some commentators do not seem to appreciate that the mere
possibility of dissenting views does not somehow change a core
258
message. Presumably, rather than simply choosing to disband, groups
253. Id. at 2978.
254. See Willems, supra note 238 at 805 ("[A]n organization that cannot
control its membership cannot control its message.").
255. See Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom
Claims in a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction between DebateDampening and Debate-Distorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505,
510 (2011) (suggesting that "such fears of hijacking are exaggerated").
256. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2992 ("Students tend to self-sort and
presumably will not endeavor en masse to join-let alone seek leadership positions
in-groups pursuing missions wholly at odds with their personal beliefs."). See also
Blake Lawrence, The FirstAmendment in the Multicultural Climate of Colleges and
Universities:A Story Ending with Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 629, 654-55 (2012) ("[Tlhe likelihood of a student making the
conscious effort to be voted into leadership of an organization only to kill it are next
to nil."); William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, Commentary, A Serious Setback for
Freedom: The implications of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 261 ED. LAW
REP. 473, 475 (2010) (noting that "no non-Christian, gay, lesbian, or bisexual
students [had] sought to join the organization or attend its meetings").
257. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)
(rejecting that the forced inclusion would result in a change of message); Bd. of Dirs.
of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) (same); Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (same).
258. See Willems, supra note 238, at 815 ("If the right to exclude is
constitutionally guaranteed in cases where an organization's ability to convey its
message depends on such a right, it is difficult to see how the Court was able to
conclude that the law school's policy did not endanger CLS's right to expressive
association."). See also Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 554 ("Without the ability to
select its own members, associations of citizens cannot effectively formulate,
identify, and communicate their views on cultural and political questions . . .").
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precluded from discriminating should choose to wait and see whether the
modification in membership rules would result in a change of
259
Indeed, with the exception of Dale, the whole right of
message.
association jurisprudence has focused on whether the organization's
message had in fact been changed significantly rather than on whether
260
the group believed that its message might be changed.
Suppose that the CLS prediction about message change later
proved to be correct. The Martinez Court noted that were that to happen,
the school administration could take appropriate steps to prevent that
from occurring in the future, for example, by changing the all-comers
policy: "If students begin to exploit an all-comers policy by hijacking
organizations to distort or destroy their missions, Hastings presumably
would revisit and revise its policy." 2 6 1 But this suggests that the Court
262
but
was not attempting to bring about a message change indirectly,
instead was permitting the state to enforce antidiscrimination norms
absent a showing of actual message modification.

259. Some commentators seem not to appreciate this. See Thro & Russo, supra
note 256, at 485 ("[S]ince some groups will decide that the 'costs' of compromising
their message are greater than the 'benefits' of accessing limited public fora, they
will forgo participation.").
260. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13 ("If a club seeks to exclude
individuals who do not share the views that the club's members wish to promote, the
Law erects no obstacle to this end. Instead, the Law merely prevents an association
from using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in
place of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining
membership."); Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548 (noting that the Unruh Act
"does not require them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high
ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace"); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628
("In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted by the
Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's
contention that, by allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will
change the content or impact of the organization's speech.").
261. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993.
262. Some commentators seem not to appreciate this. See Thro & Russo, supra
note 256, at 488-89 ("Yet, while the decision does not permit a direct ban, it does
permit an indirect ban on the offensive speech. If an organization expresses a belief
that is offensive to a segment of society, then the government may force the group to
dilute its message or abandon use of government property and communication
channels. Thus, the government accomplishes indirectly what the First Amendment
prohibits it from doing directly.").
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While admitting that "the First Amendment generally precludes
public universities from denying student organizations access to school,,263
the Court noted
sponsored forums because of the groups' viewpoints,
that an "all-comers condition on access to RSO status . . . is textbook
viewpoint neutral." 264 That said, however, the school policy did entail
that certain students were eligible to become members of the group who
would not otherwise be eligible.
All student groups faced the same danger-students would be
permitted to join any student group,265 notwithstanding the joining
266
students' disagreement with the groups' beliefs and goals. Basically,
all organizations were asked to "choose between welcoming all
students"267 on the one hand or "forgoing the benefits of official
recognition" on the other.268 For example, Hastings Outlaw, a student
269
group dedicated to combating orientation discrimination, would have
to admit students as members, even if those students wished to proclaim
the sinfulness of having sexual relations outside of a marriage composed
of one man and one woman.
The Martinez Court pointed out that student clubs had neutral
means to help decrease the likelihood that individuals would try to hijack
the clubs. For example, a student group might "condition eligibility for
membership and leadership on attendance, the payment of dues, or other
neutral requirements designed to ensure that students join because of
their commitment to a group's vitality, not its demise." 2 70 Basically, not
only was there no showing of actual message change, but the student

263. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Healy

v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)).
264. Id. at 2993.
265. See Epstein, supra note 126, at 112 ("The all-comers policy requires all
individuals to be admitted into all groups.").
266. See Brownstein & Amar, supra note 255, at 519 ("The 'all-comers'
policy disadvantages all expressive associations in essentially the same way. There is
no convincing argument that it directly distorts debate in a way that disfavors some
ideas or the groups that espouse them more than others.").
267. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
268. Id.
269. See id at 2981 n.4.
270. Id. at 2992.
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groups had neutral means by which to help assure the integrity of the
student clubs.
How does the open-membership requirement fare in light of the
past right to association jurisprudence? That depends upon which cases
one considers. In the Roberts-Rotary-New York line of cases, the Court
held that the Constitution did not prevent the states from enforcing
antidiscrimination norms where the objecting organization could not
provide evidence that a significant change in message had or would
thereby result.27 So, too, the Rumsfeld Court rejected that the state was
precluded from forcing organizations to change their association policies
merely because those organizations feared that the forced association
272
would change their message. In contrast, the Dale Court was rather
deferential to organization claims regarding the possibility of message
273
change. Most of the right to association cases supported the Martinez
274
approach, although the Dale majority would presumably have found in
favor of CLS.275
One legal issue that might be important to resolve involves the
level of scrutiny being employed in the right of association cases. Both
Rotary and New York followed Roberts,276 so an analysis of the Roberts
rationale may be the most instructive. The Roberts Court offered a
standard for determining when the state was permitted to require an
organization to modify its membership criteria, explaining that
infringement on the right to associate "may be justified by regulations
271. See supra notes 73-139 and accompanying text (discussing the three
cases).
272. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (rejecting that the mere
assertion that an organization's message would change because of a forced
association suffices for constitutional purposes).
273. See supra notes 173-213 and accompanying text (discussing the holding
of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)).
274. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 64 (2004) (finding that law school message would not be changed by allowing
military recruiters on campus); N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1, 13 (1998) (precluding discrimination absent a great showing of actual
message change); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537, 548 (1987) (same); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (same).
275. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 651 (deferring to the Boy Scouts with respect to
whether admitting gays was incompatible with their mission).
276. See N.Y State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 11-12; Rotary Club ofDuarte, 481
U.S. at 544-45.
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adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms." 27 7
The compelling state interests mentioned in Roberts are normally
associated with strict scrutiny, although the description of the required
means-the chosen means may be considered acceptable as long as there
are no significantly less restrictive means that also would have brought
278
about the same result-suggests a lower level of scrutiny.
Commentators cannot seem to agree about what level of scrutiny is being
employed in Roberts, Rotary, and New York, although these all involve
279
limitations on expressive association. Whatever the level of scrutiny
actually being employed, the Court suggested in all of these cases that
the nondiscrimination norm could be enforced because of the lack of a
showing of a significant change in message.28o
Martinez follows the Roberts-Rotary-New York line of cases in

reasoning and result-application of an antidiscrimination norm was
permissible absent a showing of significant message alteration. Various
similarities between Martinez and these cases should be noted. For
example, one of the considerations that militated in favor of requiring the
Rotary Club to open up its membership was that on average there was a
ten percent turnover in membership each year.281 By the same token,
CLS would presumably average an even higher annual turnover rate if

277. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
278. See id.
279. Compare Christian A. Malanga, Note, Expressive Association-Student
Organizations' Right to Discriminate: A Look at Public Law Schools'
NondiscriminationPolicies and Their Application to ChristianLegal Society Student
Chapters, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 780 n.183 (2007) (noting that Roberts used
strict scrutiny), and Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment
of CLS v. Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 656 (2011) (discussing the
Roberts Court's use of "the heightened scrutiny associated with expressive
association"), with Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer's Choice of
Clients: The Case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 15 (1998)
(noting the "traditional low-level of scrutiny to regulations that may infringe on
freedom of association" after discussing Roberts, Rotary and New York).
280. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
281. See Rotary Club ofDuarte,481 U.S. at 546.
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only because of the number graduating each year, given that students
tend to spend only three years in law school.28
The CLS meetings were open to all students.2 83 Just as it was not
clear that affording regular membership to women would change the
Jaycees' or Rotarians' messages when women could already attend
meetings, it was not at all clear that permitting individuals to become
members of CLS regardless of their sexual orientation or religious belief
285
would change the message of CLS. If, for example, the claim was that
the message at the meetings might be changed because of the
sensibilities of those attending, that might happen regardless of the
membership status of those who were present-messages might be toned
down because the non-members at the meeting would otherwise be
offended by inflammatory rhetoric.
D. Forum Analysis
The Martinez Court explained that the Hastings student club
program was a limited public forum.286 Hastings imposed various
limitations on any group wishing to be part of the officially recognized
"'Registered Student Organization' (RSO) program." 2 87 For example,
recognition was only open to groups that were non-commercial and
288
An
whose membership was limited to students at the law school.
289
additional requirement was that all RSO groups accept all comers.
Some commentators suggest that content-based restrictions
would also have been permissible if, for example, the group's purpose
was not at all related to the school's purposes in providing a legal
282. See Lawrence, supra note 256, at 654 (discussing the "three years of law
school").
283. See Christian Legal Soc'y of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S.

_,

_,

130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989-90 n.18 (2010).

284. See Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 541; Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
285. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2992 ("CLS points to no history or prospect of
RSO-hijackings at Hastings.").
286. See id. at 2984.
287. Id. at 2979.
288. Id.; see also Volokh, supranote 211, at 1935 (discussing why a university
might reasonably require that the groups be run by students).
289. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979.
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Perhaps that is so, although Rosenberger and Southworth
education.
suggest that content-based restrictions on student clubs in the university
291
context may be harder to defend than might originally be thought.
Justice Anthony Kennedy noted in his concurrence that "[lt]he Hasting
[sic] program is designed to allow all students to interact with their
colleagues across a broad, seemingly unlimited range of ideas, views,
and activities." 2 9 2 It is simply unclear whether content limitations in such
a forum would have been characterized as viewpoint-based and hence
293
In any event, the restriction at issue was not contentunacceptable.
294
i.e., the school did not limit eligibility to those groups that
based,
addressed only certain topics.
The Martinez Court explained that the Hastings limitations on
the public forum would be evaluated in light of a reasonableness
standard,295 and commentators have debated the reasonableness of the
Hastings policy.296 For example, there is some debate whether
290. See Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 556-57 ("Hastings could also,
presumably, limit its RSO program to groups whose objectives the school
considered sufficiently related to its program of legal education.").
291. See supra notes 61-85 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) and Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)).
292. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293. Consider some of Justice Kennedy's comments in concurrence. "When
the government does exclude from a limited forum, however, . . . content-based
judgments may be impermissible. For instance, an otherwise qualified and relevant
speaker may not be excluded because of hostility to his or her views or beliefs." See
id. at 2998 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972)).
294. Id. at 2996 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("As written, the Nondiscrimination
Policy is content and viewpoint neutral.").
295. Id. at 2988 (majority opinion).
296. See Brownstein & Amar, supra note 255, at 510 ("[T]he Hastings policy
still had to be reasonable. But given its open-endedness, what purposes does the
RSO policy really serve? Does a policy that allows any group, formed around any
set of ideas or activities, to exist--but also requires each such group to take all
persons, even those who may vehemently disagree with those ideas or activities-make much sense?"); Erica Goldberg, Amending Christian Legal Society v.

Martinez: ProtectingExpressive Association as an Independent Right in a Limited
Public Forum, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 129, 154 (2011) ("[I]t is unreasonable to
establish a forum for expression but not protect an organization's ability to safeguard
its expression when choosing members."); Massaro, supra note 35, at
578 (describing CLS's position on the reasonableness of such a policy: "CLS is an
expressive association that exists primarily, if not exclusively, to advance particular
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educational goals would be best served by bringing about diversity
297
298
within297 rather than across groups. Thus, if student groups with open
299
membership policies would indeed have more diverse memberships,
and if groups with more diverse memberships would have a greater
diversity of views being represented within the student groups,300 then
one might expect that the Hastings policy might "facilitate interactions
,301
between students, enabling them to explore new points of view . . . ."
In addition, "an all-comers policy, to the extent it brings together
individuals with diverse backgrounds and beliefs, 'encourages tolerance,
cooperation, and learning among students.", 30 2 Indeed, a student who had
been a member of the predecessor Christian student group, Hastings
Christian Fellowship, had spoken about the benefits of having an openly
gay student as a member.303
At issue before the Court was not whether the Hastings policy
was the best policy or even whether it was the most reasonable, but
ideas. To require it to yield to conditions that subvert its message and associational

cohesion was beyond coercive; CLS characterized it as 'absurd."').
297. See Brownstein & Amar, supra note 255, at 524 ("The alleged benefits of
the policy were that it promoted internal discussion and debate within groups,
protected dissenters within a group who wanted their views considered without
fearing expulsion, and guaranteed students whose fees subsidized RSOs that they
would be permitted to join any group their student fees supported."); Thro &
Russo, supra note 256, at 494-95 ("Instead of having competition among student
organizations, there will be competition within student organizations.").
298. See Linda C. McClain, Religious and Political Virtues and Values in
Congruence or Conflict?: On Smith, Bob Jones University, and Christian Legal
Society, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959, 2001 (2011) ("Is this self-exploration best
achieved through maximum diversity among different groups or by promoting
diversity within groups?").
299. See supra note 254-55 and accompanying text (noting that this is an
empirical question).
300. An individual dissenter in a particular group might not feel comfortable
voicing that dissent. Cf Carole J. Buckner, Realizing Grutter v. Bollinger's
"Compelling Educational Benefits of Diversity"- Transforming Aspirational
Rhetoric into Experience, 72 UMKC L. REV. 877, 888 (2004) ("[S]tudents often
choose silence as a way of protecting themselves from a hostile environment in and
out of the classroom.").
301. Christian Legal Soc'y of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez,

561

U.S.

_,

, 130 S.

Ct. 2971,

2999 (2012) (Kennedy,

concurring).
302. Id. at 2990 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
303. See id. at 2990 n.19.
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simply whether it was reasonable.304 Whether or not one wished to defer
305
this policy seemed
to the judgment of the Hastings administrators,
306
reasonable, even if different policies would also have been reasonable.
Because Hastings had adopted a rationally justifiable way of balancing
competing interests,307 the Court held that "Hastings' all-comers policy .
. . is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the studentorganization forum." 308 This meant that the Hastings' policy passed
constitutional muster, 3 09 and the club could not receive the benefits of
being a recognized student organization without also meeting the
relevant conditions and having an open-access policy.31o
The benefits of having that status included being "eligible to
seek financial assistance from the Law School," 3 1 1 as well as being able
to "use Law-School channels to communicate with students: They may
place announcements in a weekly Office-of-Student-Services
newsletter, advertise events on designated bulletin boards, send e-mails

304. See id. at 2992.
305. See id at 2989 (discussing the Court's giving "appropriate regard for
school administrators' judgment").
306. See Volokh, supra note 211, at 1943-44 ("The university is providing the
forum to help advance what it sees as its mission of educating the students, or at
least providing them with an interesting intellectual and social environment. If the
university decides that organizations with certain structures are especially useful to
that mission, the university should be entitled to support those organizations, even if
others may think that a more flexible approach would be better.").
307. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993 ("Hastings, caught in the crossfire between a
group's desire to exclude and students' demand for equal access, may reasonably
draw a line in the sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but no
group to discriminate in membership.").
308. Id. at 2978. See also Volokh, supra note 211, at 1941 ("[O]ne can equally
argue that a university is entitled to subsidize only groups that are accessible to
university community members without regard to race, religion, and the like.").
309. See Massaro, supra note 35, at 582-83 ("[I]f the government were
required to exempt expressive associations from its conditions on access, this would
defeat the very point of limited access forums. The definition of such forums is that
they are restricted by the government to topics or categories of speakers.").
310. See Epstein, supra note 127, at 121-22 ("In a critical passage, [Justice
Ginsburg] notes that Hastings does not impose any positive restrictions on what CLS
can do off campus with its own resources, but only indicates that it has to accept
reasonable conditions in order to be eligible for the benefits that Hastings metes out
to the various registered student organizations.").
311. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979.
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using a Hastings-organization address, and participate in an annual
Student Organizations Fair designed to advance recruitment efforts."3 12
In addition, such groups were permitted to "apply for permission to use
,,313
the Law School's facilities for meetings and office space,'
and
recognized groups were permitted to use the school's "name and
logo.,,314 Basically, the school was suggesting that a condition of
receiving these benefits was that the group employ an all-comers
policy.31 Unless the group was willing to do that, it would have to
311
forego some of the state-provided benefits.
Yet, it was not as if the groups not having RSO status had been
entirely barred from campus. The Martinez Court noted that Hastings
had "offered CLS access to school facilities to conduct meetings and the
use of chalkboards and generally available bulletin boards to advertise
events." 3 17 The Court also noted some of the ways that "the advent of
electronic media and social-networking sites" reduced the disadvantages
of
CLS
not
having
RSO
status.

E. Treating the Speech and Association Claims Together

The Martinez Court understood that there were two lines of cases
that were relevant-speech and association-and noted that CLS wanted
the Court to "engage each line of cases independently."319 The Court
rejected that invitation, arguing that it "makes little sense to treat CLS's

312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See id.
316. See id See also Volokh, supra note 211, at 1922 ("Groups have the
constitutional right to put on events and programs open only to blacks,
heterosexuals, men, or religious believers; they may also put on programs open to all
listeners but designed by group officers who are chosen in discriminatory ways. Yet
the government need not subsidize this right, just as the government need not
subsidize the rights to abortion, private schooling, or political expression about
candidates or about legislation.").
317. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2991.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 2985.
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as
,,320
and instead suggesting that
speech and association claims as discrete,
the "limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate framework
321
for assessing both CLS's speech and association rights."
One of the surprising aspects of the Martinez opinion was the
Court's implicit suggestion that CLS might have won under the right of
association jurisprudence. 32 2 The Court noted that "it would be
anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review
under our limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an
,,123
Yet, the
impermissible infringement of expressive association.
arguments that won the day in Roberts should have won the day here.
For example, the Martinez Court quotes the Roberts Court's recognition
that "'there can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association than' forced inclusion of unwelcome
But that recognition did not prevent the Roberts Court
participants."
from requiring the Jaycees to open up their regular membership, given
325
The
the lack of evidence that doing so would change the message.
same reasoning should have yielded the same result in Martinez.
Dale would seem to provide a counter-example to the claim that
Martinez is following the existing jurisprudence, 32 and the Martinez
327
Court noted and then distinguished that case. However, Dale was also
difficult to reconcile with the jurisprudence preceding it.328 Thus, with
the exception of Dale, Martinez should have been decided the same way
even if the right of association strand had been considered separately.

320. Id. (citing Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v.
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981)).
321. Id.
322. See id.

323. Id.
324. Id. at 2986 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
325. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
326. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000) (deferring to
the Boy Scouts with respect to whether forced inclusion would change the
organization's message). See also id. at 655 ("The Boy Scouts takes an official
position with respect to homosexual conduct, and that is sufficient for First
Amendment purposes.").
327. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986; Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
328. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47 (2006) (rejecting that mere assertion that an organization's message would
change because of forced association suffice for constitutional purposes).
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Commentators disagree about whether the Court's merging the
speech and association claims was noteworthy329 or even somehow
precluded by the prior jurisprudence. 330 For example, Professor Erica
Goldberg argues that "the primary reason that protections for expressive
association cannot be merged with speech protections is that expressive
association contains both speech elements (the expression of the group
and its members) and conduct elements (the act of excluding or including
members in order to promote that expression)."33 1 In her view, "the
viewpoint-neutrality test governing speech restrictions in a limited public
forum must be modified in recognition of the hybrid nature of expressive
association." 33 2 Of course, there are additional ways to view the religious
group's purpose, e.g., as "a forum in which similarly thinking individuals
could share and reaffirm their values and worship together."333 While
that is true, Roberts suggested that the forum analysis would be the same
whether it was being used for expression or religious exercise,334 which
329. See Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 546 ("[T]his decision by the Court to
merge the associational claim into a free speech claim was a critical step-1 will argue
the critical misstep-in its analysis; but it nonetheless went unremarked on by the
dissent"); B. Jessie Hill, Property and the Public Forum: An Essay on Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 49, 51 (2010) ("What
may be more noteworthy is that the Court extended forum analysis to CLS's
freedom-of-association claim as well.").
330. See Zachary R. Cormier, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: The Death
Knell ofAssociational Freedom on the College Campus, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
287, 290 (2011) ("Martinez was not a merger between free speech and associational
rights, but rather a complete eradication of associational rights in deference to
existing free speech analysis within a public forum."); Goldberg, supra note 296, at
131 ("[T]he Court merged the expressive-association claim of the Christian Legal
Society ("CLS") student organization with its speech claim, essentially negating
independent protection for CLS's right to expressive association."); David Brown,
Comment, Hey! Universities! Leave Them Kids Alone!: Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez and Conditioning Equal Access to a University's Student-Organization
Forum, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 180-81 (2011) ("The Court's decision to merge
the claims and apply public forum analysis allowed the Court to ignore the Society's
free association claim and sidestep the more difficult strict scrutiny test.").
331. Goldberg, supra note 296, at 157-58.
332. Id.
333. Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 553.
334. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) ("[T]he Court has
recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities
protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion.").
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may be one of the reasons that this additional purpose of the organization
was not emphasized. If, indeed, the Court is making a mistake by
merging the expression and association claims, it is one that has been
made in the association cases since Roberts and thus should not be
attributed to the Martinez Court as some kind of break with the past
jurisprudence.335
There is a much different way to read the Martinez Court's
suggestion that the case might have turned out differently had the Court
considered the right of association strand separately. While the RobertsRotary-New York line is perfectly compatible with Martinez in that the
Court upheld antidiscrimination norms in all of these cases where there
was no showing that the group's message had been altered by the forced
inclusion of undesired members, it may be that the Martinez Court was
implicitly trying to re-characterize the past jurisprudence. The Court may
have been attempting to sharpen the distinction between enforcement of
antidiscrimination norms in a limited public forum and enforcement of
such norms elsewhere, past case law notwithstanding.33
By implying that the Hastings policy might not have passed
muster under the right to association jurisprudence and by implying that
a similar standard was used in Roberts and Dale,3 37 the Martinez Court
suggests that it is very difficult for the state to be able to justify forcing a
group to associate with those with whom the group does not wish to
associate. But Roberts, Rotary, New York, and Rumsfeld all suggest that
the state can override the right to associate as long as it does not thereby
alter a group's message. Perhaps the Martinez opinion is less noteworthy
for its suggesting that antidiscrimination norms can be applied to an
organization in a limited public forum where there is no evidence of
message change than in its implicit attempt to boost what must be shown
335. Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 549 ("[T]he key error made by all the Justices
in Martinez was to treat the case as one primarily about the right of free speech,
rather than about freedom of association. That error was profound, and it led the
Court into a frankly nonsensical analysis; but it was also unsurprising. The Court's
miscues in Martinez are rooted in half a century of jurisprudence in which the Court
has essentially eviscerated the First Amendment's right of association.").
336. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. _,

_,

130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010) (discussing

the Court's applying "a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public
forums, as compared to other environments").

337. See id.
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by the state in other fora when attempting to apply antidiscrimination
norms in a way that will overcome associational rights.
V. CONCLUSION

The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence with respect to
speech and association has been evolving in surprising ways. While it is
clear that content discrimination is impermissible in general public fora
and that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible regardless of forum,
the Court has had some difficulty in figuring out whether a limitation is
content or viewpoint based in limited public fora. But that distinction is
crucial in that forum in particular because content discrimination in
limited public fora is examined in light of a reasonableness standard,
whereas viewpoint discrimination in that same fora is examined with
strict scrutiny.
The Court sometimes implies that content discrimination in the
university, a limited public forum, will be very difficult to justify, at least
if student groups are involved. However, the Court has been quite
amenable to other kinds of limitations, for example, limiting such groups
to students. Martinez suggests that the viewpoint-neutral approach
should also be used when determining whether a university can require
that student groups respect nondiscrimination principles, at least where it
is not shown that the nondiscrimination policy will result in a significant
change in message. That same policy reflects the Court's approach in the
right to association jurisprudence. Thus, state regulations will be struck
down only when significantly altering organizations' messages,m
although it is of course quite tempting to wonder why the Court finds an
impairment of message in some cases but not in others. 3 39

338. See Nice, supra note 279, at 660 ("One possible key to understanding the
Court's divergent reasoning was the Court's finding that forcing speakers to include
gays would impair their messages in Hurley and Dale, whereas the Court found no
such impairment in Martinez.").
339. Cf id. ("So how does the presence of a gay person impair the message of
the St. Patrick's Day parade and the Boy Scouts, but not the message of
fundamentalist Christians?").
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Martinez is less noteworthy for what it held340 than for some of
the things that it did not do. For example, it did not follow a Dale path
and defer to an organization's claim of message alteration.34 At the same
time, Martinez did something else by suggesting that the right of
association is very strong when the forum has not been limited. What
remains to be seen is whether the evolving jurisprudence will treat
Martinez as standing for the general proposition that the right to
association can be trumped by antidiscrimination norms as long as the
organization's message has not been significantly altered or, instead,
whether the right to association will now be thought more robust when a
limited public forum is not at issue. Ironically, those claiming that
Martinez signals the end of rights of association may well be relying on
Martinez in the future to support their right of association claims outside
the limited public forum context.

340. See Hill, supra note 329, at 57 ("[Tlhis failure to say anything of real

importance is perhaps the most surprising thing about the Court's decision in CLS v.
Martinez.").
341. Cf Epstein, supra note 127, at 120 ("CLS is a far easier case for freedom
of association than was Dale.").
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